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Civil Disobedience and the Law
Fraik M. Johnson, Jr.
This article is based on a speech delivered by Judge Frank M.
Johnson, Jr. to the faculty and students of the Vanderbilt Law
School. Judge Johnson's thesis is thdt "civil disobedience" presents
a special challenge to judges and lawyers. He feels that there are
alternatives to "civil disobedience" for challenging and protesting
the law and that lawyers have a duty to inform the public of these
alternate methods. Only in extreme cases does Judge Johnson
believe that "civil disobedience" is justified. He illustrates his thesis
with a discussion of the events surrounding the Democratic
Convention at Chicago.
The 1960's have witnessed the development of protest movements
which may well give the decade its name. This nation has seen other
periods of discontent, other outbursts of moral indignation, and more
than occasional fits of violence, but the movements of the 1960's seem
distinctive. One distinctive feature is the prominent role assumed,
largely for the first time, by the American student. Another and
increasingly disturbing feature of these movements has been the
tendency toward "emotionalism"-that is, emotion divorced from
reason. This emotionalism presents a special problem and a special
challenge to lawyers and responsible citizens committed to the
principle that the law is supreme and committed to the task of
maintaining that principle as a working idea in this country.
We might respond initially to that challenge by noting the
emotionalism surrounding the phrase "civil disobedience." I do not
suggest that the phrase has a precise meaning, but it does seem clear
that unrestrained and ill-considered advocacy of civil disobedience by
its proponents has led to loss of public support for certain aspects of
the protest movement that would otherwise be acceptable by
American standards. Moreover, it has unfortunately led some well-
intentioned participants into the wrong view that clearly illegal acts
would be immune from punishment. On the other hand, sweeping
condemnation of all protest as anarchy has tended to drown out
responsible criticism of protest methods by those who sympathize with
some of the goals of the protesters. The result has been increased
intolerance and polarization of opinion-two great enemies of the rule
"of law.
As a preliminary matter, one should note that many of the issues
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involved are not, strictly speaking, legal issues. For example, to the
questions "When may I disobey the law?" or "When ought I to
disobey the law?", the law has a clear and straightforward answer:
"Never!" Mr. Justice White has made this point quite precisely:
Whether persons or groups should engage in nonviolent disobedience to laws with
which they disagree perhaps defies any categorical answer for the guidance of
every individual in every circumstance. But whether a court should give it
wholesale sanction is a wholly different question wtiicli calli f6r only one answer.'
As a United States District Judge, I have had occasion to make a
similar statement:
There is no immunity conferred by our Constitution and laws of the United
States to those individuals who insist upon practicing civil disobedience under the
guise of demonstrating or protesting for 'civil rights.' The philosophy that a
person may-if his cause is labeled 'civil rights' or 'states rights'--determine for
himself what laws and court decisions are morally right or wrong and either obey or
refuse to obey them according to his own determination, is a philosophy that is
foreign to our 'rule-of-law' theory of government
Nevertheless, there are circumstances where it is clear that the
moral duty to obey the law has ceased. Even lawyers were justified, if
not morally obliged to counsel, and engage in, disobedience to the
racial laws of the Third Reich. Similarly, the laws in the Stalinist
Soviet Union ordering the genocide of the kulaks were devoid of any
moral obligation that they be obeyed
It would be a mistake to conclude from what has been said,
however, that disobedience of the law is justified if it is disobedience
in the name of higher principles. Strong moral conviction is not all
that is required to turn breaking the law into a service that benefits
society. Civil disobedience is simply not like other acts in which men
stand up courageously for their principles. Civil disobedience
necessarily involves violation of the law, and the law can make no
provision for its violation except to hold the offender liable for
punishment. This fact accounts for the delicate ambivalence of
President Kennedy's position at the time of the Negro demonstrations
in Birmingham. He gave many signs that, as an individual, he was in
sympathy with the goals of the demonstrators. As a political realist,
he probably knew that these goals could not be obtained without
dramatic actions across the line into illegality, but as Chief Executive
he could give neither permission nor approval to such actions.
I. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 328 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
2. Forman v. City of Montgomery, 245 F. Supp. 17, 24 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
3. See, e.g., A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 9-10 (1968).
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While I cannot propose a set of principles that will generate auto-
matic answers to the question "When may I disobey the law?", I can
offer some guidance toward an answer. At the outset we must distin-
guish lawful protest from disobedience of the law. The vast majority of
the protest movement in this decade has been both legal and affirma-
tively protected by our constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly. Most protest has involved totally obedient,
nonviolent challenges to law or state policy, such as distributing pamph-
lets on segregation or in opposition to the war in Viet Nam, conducting
voter registration drives, and picketing under required permits. Since it
was not held until the court approved the details of the planned
demonstration, the Selma-Montgomery march is an example of a
completely legal protest. This distinction is scarcely one that need be
belabored to lawyers. Yet in the current emotional climate it has been
a point obscured to the public and to the protesters. Lawyers should
take every opportunity to point out clearly that in all but the rarest of
circumstances there is an alternative to disobedience of law, that
protesters should adopt this alternative,, and that critics of protesters
should respect it.
It is not always easy to decide what is protected speech or
assembly and whif is disobedience of law. In the early stages of the
direct action cases, the Supreme Court frequently gave the
demonstrators protection, but the decisions were not put squarely on
first amendment grounds.' Later, as the protesters became more
diffuse in their aims and careless in their methods, the Court became
less willing to protect their a&ivities. It would seem that the Court's
recent efforts are directed at elaborating the distinction between
speech and action. The recent draft card burning case, United States
v. O'Brien,6 in which the issue of symbolic speech was raised,
indicates that approach. But it must'be remembered that a great deal
turns on the precise circumstances of the protest. One important
consideration, for example, is whether the protest is by an individual
or by a large group. Where and when the protest is to be held will
also be an important criterion. Justice Harlan suggested in O'Brien
the familiar legal principle of availability of alternatives; conduct
otherwise unprotected may be legal if it is the only available means of
4. See Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J.
1520 (1968).
5. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U S. 39
(1966).
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1969] 1091
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
communicating with a significant audience.7 I would also suggest that
the principle of proportionality has relevance here. In the Selma
march I had occasion to state:
There must be in cases like the one now presented, a 'constitutional boundary
line' drawn between the competing interests of society. This Court has the duty
and responsibility in this case of drawing the 'constitutional boundary line.' In
doing so, it seems basic to our constitutional principles that the extent of the
right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways and
streets in an orderly manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the
wrongs that are being protested and petitioned against. In this case, the wrongs
are enormous. The extent of the right to demonstrate against these wrongs
should be determined accordingly 8
In addition to the distinction between lawful protest and illegal
action, we should also be cognizant of our federal system and its
effects on persons who disobey the law. I refer to the category of
situations in which state laws are violated under claims of federal
legal right. The early sit-in cases in which Negroes claimed that state
segregation laws violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution are excellent examples. When such claims were proved
correct, the Negroes were treated as if they had not violated the law.
This situation is unique to a federal system with its hierarchical
system of laws. The supremacy clause of article VI of the
Constitution9 means that the Federal Constitution and laws must
prevail in their sphere and that state laws which conflict are null and
void.
Some critics have viewed the federal system of laws as being
responsible for a crisis in law enforcement and a deterioration of
obedience to law. Those who first raised these issues, however, were
opposed to any social and political change and had relied on the law
itself to preserve ordered injustice instead of ordered liberty. These
issues were advanced as justification for the authorities' failure to
protect the student freedom riders from assaults by Klansmen. The
argument was made that since the local law in Alabama at that time
required segregation of the races, and since the students violated these
local laws (as opposed to going to court to have them declared
invalid), they were entitled to very little protection by local officials.,"
The practice of testing the law is not unfamiliar. The law in
7. Id. at 388-89.
8. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
10. United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.
Ala. 1961).
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many areas is uncertain, governed only by broad principles-what the
philosophers refer to as "open-textured." For example, lawyers
sometimes advise making a questionable deduction from an income
tax return in order to find out whether it is legal. Although there is
occasionally a more orderly procedure available, e.g., a ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, we generally do not view these
people as lawbreakers if their actions are later proved illegal. It has
been suggested that when persons appeal over the head of the state
to the laws of the nation by asserting the Constitution, they are
impliedly submitting to rather than defying the rule of law.' There is
much to be said for that argument, especially if there is no violence,
and the violation does not interfere with the rights of others.
The preceding distinctions illustrate lawful means for protesting
and challenging the law. It is now appropriate to consider distinctions
between unlawful conduct and civil disobedience. First, I would
observe that civil disobedience does not necessarily involve violence.
There is no legal or moral justification for the rioting, burning,
looting, and killing that have occurred in the cities of Los Angeles,
Detroit, Chicago, Newark, Kansas City, and Washington.
Understandable, perhaps; justifiable, never. Similarly, all of us feel
nothing but revulsion at the senseless and brutal killings of President
Kennedy, his brother Robert, Dr. Martin Luther King, or of Medgar
Evers, Schwerner, Cheney, and Goodman in Jackson and Neshoba
Counties, Mississippi, or of Viola Liuzzo, the Rev. Mr. Daniel and
the Rev. Mr. Reeb in Lowndes and Dallas Counties, Alabama. These
acts are not an assertion of rights; nor are they justified under the
guise of civil disobedience. They are nothing more than the infliction
of gross wrongs upon innocent citizens; they are insurrections against
government. Participants in such activities, and those who by their
inflammatory and defiant statements possibly incite such activities,
disregard utterly and completely the supremacy of any law other than
the law of the jungle.
It is also appropriate to keep in mind that civil disobedience of
the law and evasion of the law are usually to be distinguished. 2 There
is really quite a startling tradition of disregard for the law in this
country; most of it, however, has been of the evasive variety. Civil
11. See Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American
Institutions of Government, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 492 (1965). See also Marshall, The Protest Move-
nent and the Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 785 (1965).
12. For an article of general interest by a layman which makes this point, see Keeton, The
Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 507 (1965).
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disobedience is usually thought of as open violation of the law under a
banner of morality or justice accompanied by at least a theoretical
willingness to accept the appropriate punishment. Those who make
moonshine whisky in my part of the country are usually merely law
violators trying to conceal their violations, even though some of them
doubtless feel that it is unjust for the United States to prosecute them
for such activity. Those who believe that the taxing of income is
contrary to natural law and therefore surreptitiously refuse to record
their income should not be put in the same category with Thoreau,
who announced to all the world his refusal to pay what he considered
an illegal and unjust tax and willingly went to jail for that refusal.
By the Aristotelian process of distinguishing away what it is not,
we have now approached a useful notion of the concept of civil
disobedience: an open, intentional violation of a law concededly valid,
under a banner of morality or justice by one willing to accept punishment
for the violation. To this definition might be added anotier refinement,
one which distinguishes a civil disobedient from a revolutionary. A civil
disobedient is one who generally obeys the law and usually recognizes
its supremacy. In other words, civil disobedience is directed at changing
the existing legal order. A revolutionary, on the other hand, directs his
lawbreaking at the total eradication of the existing legal system.
It is this concept of civil disobedience, then, that I have indicated
cannot be condoned by me in my capacity as a federal judge. The
law cannot as a matter of law officially recognize a right of civil
disobedience. It is also in this sense, I believe, that Justice Fortas
suggested that as a moral man he hoped that he would have violated
certain laws in extreme circumstances, an opinion in which I
cautiously concur. It is this concept which was advocated by Thoreau,
Gandhi, and, at least in the early years, Dr. Martin Luther King.
Similarly, unless they were nothing more than fraudulent political
demagogues, it appears to have been the belief of Governers Ross
Barnett, John Patterson, and George Wallace. These latter three may
be distinguished from the former group on the grounds that as
government officials they had a sworn duty to obey the federal laws
they were violating.
Having conceded as a moral matter that in certain extreme
circumstances civil disobedience may be justified, I cannot distinguish
my position qualitatively from the position reflected in the actions of
those mentioned above. This may be one of those situations, however,
where a quantitative difference becomes a difference in kind. I say
that because I take the writings and the utterances of Thoreau, King,
[VOL. 221094
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and Vallace as attempts to redefine obligation to law as individual
right, or perhaps individual duty, to determine whether a law is just or
unjust, and to obey it if it is considered just, and to disobey it if it is
not. The advocates of this position do not, as I understand them,
offer any qualifying principles which limit the situations in which an
individual has a right to disobey the law. With no qualifications, of
course, George Wallace, to be consistent, must acknowledge that Dr.
King had a right as an individual to violate what Dr. King considered
to be unjust laws, and Dr. King should have acknowledged the same
right to George Wallace. Moreover, the radical student who forcibly
and illegally takes over college buildings cannot consistently criticize,
in the name of the law, the administration's denial of due process
(e.g., without hearing and notice) in throwing him out of school.
Those of us who, attempt to act and think consistently must have
grave misgivings about an unqualified doctrine that an individual has
the right to violate any law he determines to be unjust. This doctrine
is morally unsound and practically foolish. While morality and law
are not coextensive, the rule of law is a necessary condition for the
exercise of individual morality in a social context. Embodied in the
notion of the rule of law are basic principles of fair dealing among
men, widely agreed upon, which govern the situations in which men's
interests and ideals conflict. These principles protect individuals from
the exercise of another man's morality and provide a degree of
flexibility for the exercise of one's own morality free from the
interference of other individuals or the state. Under the rule of law,
these principles apply, prima facie, to everyone.
The unqualified doctrine that an individual has the righit to
disobey any law he determines to be unjust is simply a more
sophisticated way of saying that a man is entitled to take the law into
his own hands. It means government by force, not by law. It means
might makes right. In short, while such an unqualified doctrine may
find short-run justification' in protesting or preventing a single
injustice, it is actually extremely shortsighted because it destroys the
condition for our full development as moral beings-the rule of law.
It is obvious that the unqualified doctrine is practically foolish
for those who now advocate it, namely, minority groups such as
militant blacks, radical students, and die-hard segregationists- all
groups with unorthodox ideas and limited access to the levers of
power. A society where each man decides which law to obey has
really reverted to anarchy, to a state of nature. Hobbes described life
19691 1095
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in the state of nature as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."'3
He might have added as a corollary that it is historically nastiest and
shortest for those of weak body and strong principle. It is only under
the rule of law that moral heterogeneity can peacefully flourish.
If we must reject both the extreme that civil disobedience is never
justified and the extreme that an individual has the right to disobey
any law he determines to be unjust, how do we determine which are
those rare circumstances in which civil disobedience may be morally
justified? There are no panaceas; one can only point to a few
benchmarks and suggest hard, honest thought. Thinking should begin
with an almost irrebuttable presumption that civil disobedience is not
justified. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, proof to a moral
certainty, is required before we take that serious step. This almost
irrebuttable presumption finds its justification in American
constitutional democracy. We might even define our system as one
designed to provide alternatives to civil disobedience. Majority rule is
a key feature of this system. Elaborate institutions have evolved to
insure that majorities are indeed majorities. But there are definite
limits on the substantive powers of the majority. Basic standards of
due process and equal protection regulate the modes by which those
powers may be exercised. Minorities in America are insured the
fundamental political freedoms of speech, press, and assembly which
make it possible for them to become tomorrow's majorities. Finally,
one must observe that these principles of government are more than
pious admonitions to the wielders of power. Enshrined in a living
Constitution, these principles are given the force and majesty of law
through the operation of our unique institution of judicial review.
These are the ideals of our constitutional democracy. In practice,
in actual accomplishment, we may find considerable shortfall. Courts
may be biased, elections rigged, legislators bought, or the police
hostile. Our history does reflect all too frequent examples of such
shortcomings. But with only the rarest of exceptions, the
shortcomings of individuals have not created serious unresponsiveness
in our institutions over long periods of time. I submit that a serious,
extensive, and apparently enduring breakdown in the responsiveness of
our institutions must be a necessary condition of justified civil
disobedience. In the recent history of the United States, I could cite
only the persistent and flagrant denial of the rights of our Negro citizens
in certain parts of the South as an example of this kind of breakdown.
I would also suggest a pragmatic evaluation of the consequences
13. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. I, Ch. XIII (1651).
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of particular acts of civil disobedience. One should consider the risk
that a peaceful act of disobedience may erupt into violent
confrontation. Violence is never justified in the name of civil
disobedience. One should also consider whether the act of
disobedience will foster disrespect for law in general. Civil
disobedients often do not intend to foster disrespect, but their actions
can have and have had that effect. This is particularly true when the
provocation is obscure and the disobedience is general and unfocused.
Pragmatically speaking, in justified civil disobedience basic principles
must be at issue, the provocation must be extreme, and the evils likely
to endure unless most vigorously combated.
These considerations suggest that in terms of moral justification
we note the difference between the practice of civil disobedience by
large dissident groups as a tactic of political protest and civil
disobedience by an individual as a private assertion of personal
conviction. In the latter situation, there is virtually no risk of violence
and the effect on attitudes toward law is likely to be slight. Indeed,
there is a tradition in this country of deferring to the mandates of the
individual conscience. The free exercise clause of the first amendment
and the provisions for conscientious objectors in the selective service
laws are prime examples of this. It is in this sense that we inherit a
tradition of civil disobedience from men of the moral stature of
Socrates, Jesus Christ, and St. Thomas More.
Having discussed in broad, general principles the nature of civil
disobedience and the justified occasions of its exercise, it is now useful
to apply some of these principles to a concrete situation. Since the
matter will not be litigated in the federal courts of Alabama or the
Fifth Circuit, I have chosen the events surrounding the Democratic
Convention in Chicago as an example.
The acrimonious debate since the Democratic Convention has
focused on whether the police or the demonstrators should shoulder
the bulk of the blame for the extreme violence which marked their
confrontation. Less attention has been given to how the confrontation
might have been softened or avoided. The following news analysis,
written by J. Anthony Lukas for the New York Times shortly after
the Convention, faced this unconsidered issue:
When they demanded the right to sleep in Lincoln Parik, with the cry 'the
parks belong to the people,' the police drove them out with tear gas. When they
requested permits for a protest march to the Amphitheatre, they were refused.
And when they provoked the police by shouting 'pigs' and 'fascists,' the force
took off all wraps, clubbing not only young people but newsmen and innocent
bystanders as well.
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New Yorkers here this week speculated on how Mayor Lindsay would have
handled the same situation. They concluded that he would have invited the
demonstrators to sleep in the park (perhaps even going in to toast hot dogs with
them) and then would have personally arranged a route of march for them to a
demonstration spot near the Amphitheatre.
This kind of stance would hardly have satisfied the young revolutionaries
like Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden of the mobilization committee. Theirs is a
strategy of confrontation. If they could not have got confrontation over the
parks or parade routes, they would probably have got it over something else.
But granting the protesters their right to demonstrate and showing some
concern for them might have deprived the small revolutionary core of some of its
more moderate supporters. It undoubtedly would have softened the impact on
thousands of Americans who watched the police tactics on television."
Discounting the journalistic license, there is considerable
wisdom-the wisdom of the Constitution of the United States-in
that analysis. It seems clear that a substantial number of the
demonstrators were interested only in peaceful expression of their
dissent. 5 In any event, even revolutionaries are entitled to speak until
they create a clear and present danger of serious disorder. The issues
raised by the demonstrators cannot be dismissed as frivolous. They
were challenging the morality and legality of our participation in a
war which has taken and continues to take a great many American
and Vietnamese lives. They were also challenging the responsiveness of
our basic political institutions. Whether or not their claims are
ultimately meritorious, they are entitled to expression.
The Constitution protects that right of expression. While the right
of assembly is subject to reasonable restrictions, especially when large
crowds are involved, it seems apparent that the officials in control had
determined that no large demonstrations were to be permitted,
however restricted." It is clear that some efforts were made by some
groups to obtain permits and otherwise comply with the law." fhe
responsible officials apparently chose to ignore the distinction between
legal protest and civil disobedience and were determined to meet the
demonstrators with force.8
Let me make clear that I am not suggesting that the protesters
had an unqualified right to demonstrate. They did not have a right to
disrupt the Convention, to snarl the traffic along Lake Michigan, or to
14. Lukas, Outlook After Chicago Violence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1968, at II, col. 3.
15. D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 4 (Grosset & Dunlap, Publishers 1968) (Walker
Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence).
16. See generally id.
17. Id. at 31-42.
18. This was the view, for example, of an article apparently written before the violence.
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2, 1968, at 26.
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or to endanger the security of leading government officials and poli-
ticians attending the Convention. But they did have the right to demon-
strate subject to reasonable restrictions designed to protect these other
interests. If the official attitude was to ignore that right it was not
only disrespectful of our constitutional heritage, but it may have
partially caused or intensified the violent confrontation that followed.
It must also be noted that once the demonstrators were refused
permits, much of what they did subsequently was in violation of the
law. Some of these actions might fit in the category of testing local
laws against the Constitution, but others went considerably beyond
this and clearly constituted civil disobedience. I cannot justify the civil
disobedience in these circumstances. While the refusal to grant
permits may have been unjust, it hardly constituted a breakdown of
seeming permanence in the responsiveness of our institutions. The
response of the so-called "Establishment" in the form of the Walker
Report 9 seems ample hindsight evidence of that.
The events in Chicago, some of which invaded our living robims
through television, seem directly traceable to the emotionalism which
has become so prevalent in this country. Much of that spectacle could
have been prevented had emotions divorced from reason not blurred
the distinction between those who exercise the constitutional rights of
free expression and those who resort to civil disobedience and
violence. Much of the confrontation could have been avoided if this
emotionalism had not generated the unqualified belief that an
individual has the right to disobey any law he determines to be unjust
and if it had not bred such intolerance of ideas that public opinion
was nearly paralyzed by polarization.
Lawyers bear special responsibilities in any society built upon the
rule of law. Perhaps nowhere are those responsibilities as great as they
are in the United States. In this country, lawyers are not only legal
technicians, but they are our principal social generalists. It is this
tradition which has caused me to address the special-responsibilities of
lawyers concerning these problems which require for their solution
political and moral wisdom rather than technical legal skill. In
combating emotionalism and demagoguery, we lawyers have an
educational function with respect to laymen. Lawyers must clarify and
illumine the distinction between the constitutionally-pirotected rights of
expression and violation of the law. They must make clear that the
19. D. WALKER, supra note 15.
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law does not recognize a right of civil disobedience and that violators
must expect to be punished.
Lawyers must also be vigilant in keeping our institutions
responsive to claims of injustice and voices of dissent. If we succeed in
this, the condition for justifiable civil disobedience will rarely exist.
Finally, we must expend our energies in eliminating injustice through
legal channels, lest the victims take to the streets. Chief Justice
Warren recently counseled sagely:
'I am certain of only one thing. . . though the principles which have sustained
us in preserving individual liberty will be as valid as ever-the techniques of
yesterday cannot be the techniques of the future. The legal profession, like all
professions, must move with the times and be part of our times.
'Our Constitution and laws are, in the last analysis, only meaningful when
lawyers have the courage and zeal to stand up in court and assert them. Unless
one trained in the law and fearless in advocacy takes on the causes of justice,
those causes are forgotten . ,0
I challenge lawyers only to fulfill the finest traditions of our
profession: direct your efforts in this hour of emotionalism in support
of the continuing struggle to maintain the rule of law.
20. TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1968, at 40.
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